ABSTRACT The notion of cyber-physical power grid is to use metering, communication, and control to make an intelligent and autonomous power system. Therefore, the smart meters form the basis of the cyber-physical system. Recentlyan increasing number of synchrophasor measurement units (PMU) and micro synchrophasor measurement units (µPMU) have been deployed in transmission grids and distribution networks, respectively. Because of the importance of these data, it is imperative to guarantee its integrity and authenticity. In this paper, the measurement structure and data format of the synchrophasor data are analyzed, which reveals the vulnerability of PMU data to cyber-attacks. Then the signal separation method, i.e., independent component analysis algorithm, and its behavior are investigated, which reveals the mechanism of the PMU data attacks. Further, a cognitive radio (CR) based secure network architecture is propose as a countermeasure. With the stochastic but confined choice of the bandwidth and an unfixed number of Splepian tapers, the proposed architecture makes the data stream much harder to intercept by dynamically exploiting the unused PU band. The effectiveness of the proposed network is validated by the simulation results.
INDEX TERMS Cyber-attack, cognitive radio network (CRN), independent component analysis (ICA), smart gird (SG), synchrophasor measurement unit (PMU).
NOTATION
The following symbols are used in this paper: Eigenvalue of the kth eigenspectrum;
I. INTRODUCTION
The PMU data is very useful for system monitoring and control due to its accuracy, synchronism and fine-grained reporting rate [1] , [2] . However, these critical data become the primary targets of the hackers or terrorists. In the future cyber-physical coupled grid, more and more PMUs/µPMUs will be integrated, which inevitably makes the grid more susceptible to the malicious attacks [3] - [5] . Unfortunately, many researchers did not realize this problem and arbitrary assume that the PMU data is secure. For instance, a defensive countermeasure was proposed to tackle the false data injection attacks against power system state estimation [6] , in which the authors assume that all the PMU measurements are free of bad data. The same assumption was made in other literature [7] , [8] .
The fact that dispersive PMU data is transmitted either over the legacy communication network or the newly constructed wireless network to the synchrophasor data center (PDC) makes the measurements especially vulnerable to a wide range of cyber-attacks [9] . One of the major threats is data tampering such as false data injection, data modification and replay attacks [10] . The virtual private network (VPN) tunnels can be used to enhance privacy and security. However, it is still vulnerable to some cyber-attacks, such as denial of service (DoS) attack. Side-channel analysis, e.g., packer size side-channel and inter-packet timing sidechannel could be potentially exploited by the hackers to differentiate the PMU packet sources [11] . Thus, the adversaries can launch an attack targeting a specific PMU stream among the mixed traffic. Some countermeasures were proposed, e.g. in [12] , the authors used principal component analysis (PCA) and support vector machine (SVM) to detect the false data injection; and in [13] and [14] , a data-driven approach was proposed to distinguish false injected data and power grid incidents by exploiting the spatiotemporal correlations among multi PMU measurements. As the legacy communication network is very vulnerable to the malicious attack, a bit masking technique based security framework was proposed to provide trusted, confidential and integral data aggregation [15] . On the other hand, progress has been made on the simulation testbed for cybersecurity research within the PMU time frame. An interactive, extensible simulation package was set up in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, which comprises a hackable PMU simulator, hackable PDC simulator and control center simulator [16] , [17] .
In this paper, we first analyze the synchrophasor measurement system and the synchrophasor message format, through which one can understand the vulnerability of the PMU data due to the openness and looseness nature of the transmission network. Then the independent component analysis (ICA) algorithm is applied to conduct signal separation by the adversaries, through which one can learn the attacking mechanism against PMU data. Afterward, a cognitive radio based network is proposed to securely transmit the data from individual PMUs to a local PDC (or local PDC to the regional PDC). Finally, simulations are conducted to verify the proposed secure network. The simulation platform used here is the dynamics simulation environment (DS), which communicates with other packages using C37.118.2 protocol, i.e. the exact IEEE standard for PMU data transfer. The main contribution of this paper is threefold:
(1) According to the IEEE standard for synchrophasor data transfer, the data format and data transmission network are analyzed to reveal the vulnerability of the PMU data. By this means, we highlight the high risk of cyber-attack against PMU measurements.
(2) The signal separation technique ICA is commonly applied for the separation of artifacts in MEG (Magnetoencephalography) data or reducing noise in natural images. However, in this paper, we show that with some modifications according to the characteristics of the PMU data, ICA can to be exploited to conduct the malicious cyber-attack against PMU data. The objective function and window length of the sampling data are analyzed.
(3) A secure communication network based on cognitive radio technology is proposed to elaborate both the basic architecture and the security mechanism. With the stochastic but confined choice of the bandwidth and an unfixed number of Splepian tapers, the proposed architecture makes the data stream much harder to intercept by dynamically exploiting the unused PU band. The implementation considerations are also analyzed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the section of ''Vulnerability Analysis of PMU Data to Cyber-Attacks,'' the measurement structure and data format of the synchrophasor data are analyzed. It reveals the vulnerability of PMU data to cyber-attacks. In the section of ''Malicious Attack towards PMU Measurements,'' the signal separation method ICA and its behavior are investigated, which reveals the mechanism of the PMU data attack. In the section of ''Cognitive Radio based Communication network for Secure PMU Data transmission,'' a novel cognitive radio based communication network architecture is proposed. In the ''Simulation and Results,'' the effectiveness of the proposed architecture is validated by the simulation results. Finally, the paper is concluded in the last section.
II. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF PMU DATA TO CYBER-ATTACTS A. SYNCHROPHASOR MEASUREMENT STRUCTURE
A simple synchrophasor network structure comprised of several PMUs, PDCs, and routers are shown in Figure 1 . Typically, the geographically dispersed PMUs collect data and send it in real time to the local PDC where the data is time-aligned and aggregated. Further, the local PDCs are connected to a central PDC, where the system-wide snapshot of the power grid measurements is rendered. The hierarchical structure of the PDCs is designed to serve the hierarchical power system: substation, utility, control area, reliability coordinator, and interconnection. In addition to the time-align and aggregation functions, the PDC has many other functions, such as data quality check, insertion of appropriate flags for disturbance, result display, etc. From Fig. 1 , it can be seen that the traffic consists of more than one data stream, each with a different format, content, reporting rate, etc. Thus, each data steam must have its own IDCODE, which is a data steam ID number for identification and separation configuration control.
It is worth noting that the data transmission discussed here is in real-time manner, which means that data will be sent immediately after measurement with a predefined time interval. As communication technology advances, synchrophasor communication method has been evolving from the original RS-232 serial to Internet Protocol (IP) over Ethernet. In recent years, the wireless communication methods, e.g., GSM, GPRS, and 4G, are booming and have also been applied to the power grid. None of these communication methods, i.e., TCP, UDP, mixed TCP/UDP, or 4G can be regarded as a secure communication approach because of their openness and looseness nature. Take UDP (User Datagram Protocol) for example, it is difficult to control the data steams since more than one client is accessible to the connectionless port. Multicast is always applied to minimize the network traffic, allowing numerous clients to receive it. Besides, the hash function used in UDP is public. All these characteristics make the attack feasible. The adversary can listen to the traffic and inject false data into the package or change the correct dataset.
B. SYNCHROPHASOR MEASUREMENT FORMAT
The IEEE standard C37.118.2 defines the format and transmission order of PMU message. There are four types of PMU message: data message, configuration, header, and command. The frame type is defined by the bits 6-4 in the SYNC word. From Fig. 2 , we can see all message frames start with a 2-byte SYNC word and end up with a CHECK word.
Here we analyze the security mechanism regarding the synchrophasor data format. For the data frame, there is a STAT word as illustrated in Table 1 . Every PMU data block is headed by a STAT word that gives a complete status of the data block. Bit 15 -Bit 14 are used as data error indication, which will be set to 01 if data is absent or set to 10 if the data is absent but data tags have been inserted. The principle is that the PDC will wait a predefined amount of time for the multi PMU stream to arrive and send whatever when the time is up. However, a fixed-size data frame is required for PMU data transmission so that the PDC will provide a filler and Bit 15 -Bit 14 are set to 10 for indication. Another way to indicate data absence is to put an invalid data in the data frame, e.g., the value 0 × 8000 (−32768) is used to signify the absent data for the rectangular form fixed-point measurement. Bit 13 is used to indicate the PMU data is synchronized or not. It will be set to 1 to signify a loss of satellite tracking or time input connection failure. In this case, the concentrator cannot integrate the PMU data by using its time tag. Instead, the data will be sorted by the ''data arrival time,'' and Bit 12 will be set to 1. Bit 9 is a data modified indicator, which will be set to 1 if the phasor measurement is modified by a post-processing device.
Although every type of PMU message ends up with a cyclic redundancy code (CRC) check to verify that a data block has not been corrupt, it is a common and standard method that is easy to be cracked. The frame format of the synchrophasor measurement is also quite simple and straightforward. Thus, the adversary is able to break the encryption even it is encrypted.
III. MALICIOUS ATTACK TOWARDS PMU MEASUREMENTS A. PMU TRAFFIC SEPERATION ALGORITHM: INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS (ICA)
As explained in the previous section, a PMU traffic may consist of more than one data stream from different 65596 VOLUME 6, 2018 PMUs concurrently. To launch a stealthy attack that can bypass the bad data detection method, the adversary needs to separate the compound traffic and injects false data into specific targets. Here, we will prove that the independent component analysis (ICA) algorithm can be used to differentiate the mixed traffic with some minor modifications.
Consider there are several samples x 1 (t), x 2 (t),. . . ,x m (t), and each of them is a weighted sum of n independent components, denoted as s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n . The linear equation is expressed as:
where a 11 , a 12 , . . . , a mn are the weight parameters, t is the time index. For convenience, we rewrite (1) in the vectormatrix form:
where x denotes the mixtures x 1 , . . . , x n , s denotes the independent components s 1 , . . . s n , and A denotes the weight parameters. Eq. (2) is the ICA model. As can be seen from (2), the only element known in this model is the random vector x, while the ''source signals'' s and the mixing matrix A need to be estimated. ICA is very similar to the blind source separation (BSS) method, which means very little information is required to perform the separation [19] .
Precondition: The precondition for a possible ICA solution is that all the independent components must be non-Gaussian. Proof: Let us assume that s i is Gaussian, then x i will be Gaussian too. Considering x 1 , x 2 . . . x n , we have their joint density:
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , it can be seen that the joint density is completely symmetric. Therefore, it is impossible to conjecture the directions of the columns of the mixing matrix A by locating the edges of the distribution pattern. This proves the Precondition.
Lemma: Let us assume all components are independent, non-Gaussian, and have identical distributions. The problem of the ICA is equivalent to finding a mixing matrix A −1 that maximizes the non-Gaussianity of (A −1 ) T x.
Proof: In probability theory, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) establishes that, in some situations, when independent random variables are added, their properly normalized sum tends toward a Gaussian distribution even if the original variables themselves are not Gaussian distributed. Therefore, even if the components s i are independent and non-Gaussian, their sum x i tends to be Gaussian.
According to (2) , the independent components can be denoted as s = A −1 x. Therefore, the linear combination of x i can be denoted as
Defining z = A T A −1 and manipulating (4), we have
According to the Central Limit Theorem, the linear combination of s i will be more Gaussian than any of the original variables and becomes least Gaussian when it equals one of the s i . Therefore, the objective of the ICA problem can be formed, i.e., find a mixing matrix A −1 to maximize the non-Gaussianity of (A −1 ) T x.
Two quantitative measures of the non-Gaussianity, i.e. the objective function for ICA estimation, are introduced as follows.
Kurtosis: The classic kurtosis of a variable y is defined as
For a Gaussian random variable, the value of the kurtosis is zero. While for most non-Gaussian variables, the absolute value of kurtosis will be greater than zero. Sub-Gaussian or super-Gaussian can be rendered depending on the positivity/ negativity of the kurtosis value. Negentropy: Innovated in the information theory, the entropy H is used to indicate the ''randomness'' of the variables. The more unstructured and unpredictable the variable is, the larger value of its entropy. For a discrete random variable Y , the entropy is defined as
where a i is the possible value of Y . And for the continuousvalued variables, the entropy H is defined as
where f (y) is the density of y. A modified model of the continuous-valued entropy, named negentropy, is defined as
where y guass is a random variable with Gaussian distribution. The fundamental property of the entropy is that it has the largest value when the variable is Gaussian distributed [20] , [21] . Therefore, the negentropy will be zero if the variable is Gaussian distributed. VOLUME 6, 2018
B. THE PROCESS OF ICA BASED ON THE CHARACTERISTIC OF PMU DATA
From the attacker's point of view, it is not necessary to differentiate all the PMU streams as long as one or two steams are separated for the attacking purpose. Therefore, it is desirable to modify the traditional multi-unit estimation algorithm. To estimate the independent components one by one, the hacker may first randomly choose a weight vector, denoted as d. The weight vector is one of the rows of the inverse of A. Then an approximate Newton iteration is applied to calculate the gain value d + . Here we use the negentropy as the objective function of the non-Gaussian maximization, i.e.
J(y) ∝ [E{G(y)} − E{G(v)}]
2 ,
where y is the variable to be estimated, and v is a standardized Gaussian variable, i.e. zero mean and unit variance. Theoretically, G could be any non-quadratic function. However, the estimator can be more robust if G is chosen wisely. Denoted the derivative of the non-quadratic function as g, we have
where g is the derivative of g. The new weight vector is calculated as w = w + / w + . If not converged, repeat calculating d + until the old and new values of d point in the same direction. The report rate of PMU data is extremely high, up to 30-60 times per second. Therefore, the amount of data contained in the mixed signal would be huge even if the sampled window length is very short. It is better to ''whiten'' the observed variables before processing, which means to linearize the vector x into a new vectorx with uncorrelated components and unitary variances.
A common way to whiten the variable is to use eigenvalue decomposition method (EVD). The new whitened vector is computed as follow:
where E is an orthogonal matrix comprised of eigenvectors of E{xx T } and D is a diagonal matrix comprised of the eigenvalues of E{xx T }. The sampled mixed signals x(1),. . . ,x(T ) are used to form xx T , and then the expectation can be computed. It is worth noting that the new mixing matrixÃ is orthogonal, which means only half of the parameters need to be estimated. The whitening process greatly accelerates the speed of the algorithm.
The window length of each sample also needs to be carefully selected. The dilemmatic condition is that too long sampling window length increases the computational complexity, while too short time window length will make the ICA infeasible. The time window length will be discussed in the ''Simulation and Result'' section.
IV. COGNITIVE RADIO BASEDCOMMUNICATION NETWORK FOR SECURE PMU DATA TRANSMISSION A. THE ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK
The cognitive radio (CR) is regarded as the core technology of the fifth generation (5G) wireless network [22] . The CR can be programmed and configured dynamically to use the best wireless channel in its vicinity to avoid user interference and congestion. Given that CR can detect the available channel automatically and changes its transmission or reception parameters accordingly, artificial intelligence and machine learning become essential to this technology. The original intention of the CR invention is to allocate the ''white space'' spectrum, i.e. spectrum holes, to the unlicensed users (SUs) by exploiting the spectrum portions unused by the licensed users (PUs). To achieve this, the CR cycle includes four functions as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The spectrum sensing function gains environment information, such as the available spectrum, the condition of primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). The spectrum decision function decides the best channel for SUs and spectrum sharing functions are used to utilize the available channel more effectively by sharing the channels among multiple SUs. After that, the spectrum modification function modifies SU's channel when it is interfering with the PU's legitimate licensed band.
B. A SECURE CR BASED NETWORK FOR PMU DATA TRANSMISSION
Typically, there are three kinds of architectures for cognitive radio network (CRN), i.e. infrastructure, ad-hoc, and mesh [23] . Here, we proposed a secure CR-based network architecture for PMU data transmission, illustrated as in Fig. 5 .
Since AMI meters are considered to be a vital part in the future Smart Grid, we include them in the loop to better illustrate the future network modality. The cognitive radio base 65598 VOLUME 6, 2018 station (CR-BS) plays an important role in this architecture. It not only works as a wireless router but also detects the spectrum holes and estimates the channel states. Unlike the infrastructure architecture and ad-hoc architecture, the PMUs and AMIs in the proposed architecture can either access the CR-BSs directly or through other PMUs/AMIs as multi-hop relay nodes. Besides, the spectrum used for data transmission is not predefined, but dynamically calculated by the CR-BSs according to the spectrum holes. This makes the stream routes difficult to predict, so the data will be much harder to intercept. It can be seen from Fig. 5 that the proposed CR-based network is not connected to the backbone network because there are enough available spectrums holes and the capacity of the wireless links is sufficient to serve as a wireless backbone. This self-content architecture further enhances the network security.
The essential characteristic of the CR is to exploit unused spectrums in a secure manner. Therefore, the spectral estimation is of paramount significance in the CR cycle. It is well known that the bias-variance dilemma, i.e. the contradiction of estimation bias and variance, makes the spectral estimation difficult. Here, a modified multitaper spectral estimation (MSE) method is applied to solve this problem. Based on the multiple orthonormal tapers, an approach was first proposed by Thomson [24] , the MSE linearly expands the time series in a fixed bandwidth, i.e. f − W to f + W , in the Slepian sequences which is also known as discrete prolate spheroidal sequences [25] . Assuming a time series and an orthonormal sequence of K Splepian tapers, we then have the associated eigenspectra:
The time-band-width p = N · 2W , where 2W is a resolution bandwidth defining the eigenspectral energy distribution. If we just keep the first few eigenspectra, the multitaper spectral estimation can be denoted as where λ k is the eigenvalue of the kth eigenspectrum. This approach allows us to trade spectral resolution for reducing variance by properly tuning the parameters K and p.
With the stochastic but confined choice of the bandwidth W (therefore the time-band-width p) and an unfixed number of Splepian tapers K , the spectrum used by the SUs is quite hard to trace for the hackers.
C. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
For the legacy WAMS, i.e. the wide area monitoring system, the information is normally transmitted via cables due to the long transmission distance. For example, the North America Synchro-phasor Initiative Network (NASPInet), is designed to transmit geographic distributed PMU data via Data Bus. It is envisioned that the NASPInet, which is composed of Phasor Gateways (PGs) and a Data Bus (DB), will coordinate different access requirements and ultimately establish a ''data superhighway'' for electric utilities, Independent System Operators (ISO), Regional Transmission Operators (RTO), and etc. [26] .
Cognitive ratio network belongs to the wireless regional area network (WRAN), whose physical layer and medium access layer are defined by the standard IEEE 802.22 [27] . Compare to other IEEE 802 standards such as 802.11 or 802.20, the 802.22 has a much better coverage range. The typical cell radius reaches to 30 to 100km, which makes it suitable for middle and short range data transmission. So the distribution power grid is the most desirable implement scenario for its comparatively limited node distance. The typical channel capacity is 18 to 24Mbps and it can support 12 customer premises equipment (CPEs), i.e. PMUs in this case, which makes it ideal for high-frequency PMU data transmission. Because normally one base station (BS) shall not contain as much as 12 PMUs. However, it is worth noting that different PMU enabled applications have different QoS (quality of service) requirements, such as reliability, latency, data rate, and etc. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate effective algorithms, e.g. PCA and SVM for dimensionality reduction [22] , and do spectrum management to meet the QoS requirements. Table 2 compares the features of CR with other transmission techniques frequently used in power system. 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS

A. ICA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the signal separation ability of the ICA algorithm, we analyze a mixed data stream comprised of two PMU frequency measurements. The data stream lasts 30 seconds and the frequency varies from 25Hz to 70Hz. There are some oscillations occur during the time, e.g. 8s to13s and 23s to28s. Fig. 6 shows the measured signal. Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(c) are the original PMU signals s 1 and s 2 , i.e. the ''source signal.'' Fig. 6(d) and Fig. 6(e) are the separated signal of s 1 and s 2 processed by the proposed ICA algorithm. Comparing the separated signal s 1 (s 2 ) with the original one, we can see that they are very much alike.
As the sampling time and the number of ''source signal'' have a big effect on the performance of the signal separation, the output peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) versus the number of ''source signals'' and sampling window lengths is analyzed. It can be seen from Fig. 7 that for all sampling window lengths the value of PSNR is decreasing as the increase of ''source signals.'' Four sampling window lengths are compared, i.e. L = 1s, 0.01s, 0.1s and 10s. It is an obvious observation that the algorithm performs much better when L = 1. 
B. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED CR NETWORK
An IEEE 123-node benchmark system is used to form the backbone of the CR based network. The distance between each node can be found in [28] . Fig. 8 characterizes the network topology by overhead and underground lines, 18 PMUs and 85 AMI meters. Therefore, the SUs are 18 if the AMIs are excluded, and 103 if the AMIs are included. We assume there are 20 PU spectrum bands. In this case, the 18 or 103 SUs will opportunistically make use of the 20 PU channels. The attack is simulated by the ''hackable PMU simulator'' module in the Dynamic Simulation environment [16] , which allows operators to choose cyber-attack events for the selected PMUs. All the following simulations are executed on a computer with Intel Core i7 4.2 GHz, 16 GB of RAM.
Two main attacks targeting PMU transmission networks are the denial of service (DoS) attack and false data injection (FDI) attack. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed CR-based network against the two attacks, we introduce the packet loss rate (PLR) and data authentic rate (DAR) as the performance evaluation metrics. For the DoS attack, the perpetrator seeks to flood the host (here the host is a PMU or PDC) with superfluous requests so that the packet loss rate arise. As for the false data injection attack, the data steam is intercepted and tampered by the perpetrator so that the authenticity of the received data can be jeopardized.
In the previous section, we argued the proposed architecture is able to accommodate AMI meters as well as PMUs. Two scenarios are investigated to show the effect of the inclusion of 85 AMI meters. CASE 1: All 85 AMI meters are included. CASE 2: All 85 AMI meters are excluded. Fig. 9 shows the effectiveness of the proposed network architecture against DoS and FDI attacks for both cases. The PU band usage rate ranges from 10% to 80% and the attacking rates are set to be 20%, 40%, 60%. Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(b) show that in the circumstance of the proposed network the packet loss rate is much lower comparing with the case where ad-hoc architecture is applied. Fig. 9(a) shows the performance of the proposed architecture when all AMI meters are included, and Fig. 9 (b) represents CASE 2, i.e. all 85 AMI meters are eliminated. Comparing the two figures, we can draw the conclusion that the inclusion of the AMI meters in the CR based secure network slightly affects the security performance. Especially, the PLR is very similar in two cases when the attacking rate is below 20%. Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 9(d) show that in the circumstance of the proposed network, the data authenticity rate is much higher than the case where the ad-hoc network is used. Comparing Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 9(d) , we can see that the DAR is slightly compromised when all the AMI meters are included in CASE 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last decades, the power grid has gone through tremendous changes regarding metering, communication, control and interacting with consumers. In the future, the smart grid would be even smarter thanks to the massive deployment of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and information communication technologies (ICTs). As the ever-increasing PMU and µPMU devices deployed in the field to facilitate this transformation, it is imperative to design a secure network for PMU data transmission. This paper first investigates the vulnerability of the PMU data to cyberattacks, then points out that an ICA approach could be exploited by the perpetrators to conduct stealthy cyber-attacks by targeting specific data streams. A CR-based secure network is proposed to tackle this problem. With the stochastic but confined choice of the bandwidth and an unfixed number of Splepian tapers, the proposed architecture is able to make the data stream much harder to intercept by dynamically exploiting the unused PU band, which. The effectiveness of CR-based architecture is verified by the simulation results. 
